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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No. 14411
-vsCARLTON CURTIS,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a criminal case in which the appellant was
convicted of distributing for value a controlled substance in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)A(a)(ii) (1953).
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
On July 2, 1975, the defendant-appellant was tried
to a jury before the Honorable Allen B. Sorensen, and found
guilty of the offense of unlawful distribution of a controlled
substance for value.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent, the State of Utah, seeks affirmation of
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the trial court's decision overruling defendant-appellant's
motion for a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The testimony at trial indicates that the following
events transpired:
The appellant was tried and found guilty by a jury
on July 2, 1975, for the offense of unlawful distribution for
value of the controlled substance, lysergic acid diethylamide
(LSD) to the State's chief witness, Mary Lee Bosh.
Mary Bosh testified in substance as follows:

she

was employed by Region Four Narcotic Task Force, and in the
course of her employment met with police officers at the
Region Four Task Force office in Provo, Utah, on January 2,
1975.

At this time she was searched, as was her car (Tr.

10,11).

No drugs were found on her person or in her car

(Tr.18,20).

She was then given money by the police officers

with which to purchase drugs, which purchase she had previously set up.

She left this meeting and met Karen Davis,

who directed her to the Provo Western Motel, where the
defendant sold Mary Bosh three squares of "acid" for ten
dollars.

She thereupon left the motel, took Karen Davis

home and met with police officers, there delivering to
them the "acid." (Tr. 11-13).

-2-
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Mary Bosh further testified that she was a confidential informant for Region Four Narcotics Task Force, and
was paid a commission based on how much money she spent for
each buy.
Other witnesses for the State corroborated the
testimony of Mary Bosh as it related to the times prior to
entering the motel and after returning to the police (Tr.
18,20).

They also testified that the "acid" was delivered

by Officer Phil Johnson to Dr. Wesley Parrish for testing
(Tr.7).
(Tr.23).

Mary Bosh turned the acid over to Officer Johnson
Examination and testing of the substance revealed

that it was lysergic acid diethylamide (Tr.8).
Karen Davis testified that during the time Mary
Bosh was in the motel with them no one sold her anything
(Tr.26) . The defendant denied giving Mary Bosh any "acid"
(Tr.30), although Karen Davis admitted that drugs changed
hands in the motel room (Tr.26).
The defendant subsequently submitted an affidavit
of bias on the part of a juror.

The affidavit alleged

that a juror was a supervisor where the defendant formerly
worked, and that the defendant did not recognize this juror
until a recess in the trial when he (juror) was pointed
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out by defendant's mother.

The affidavit also states that

the defendant never informed his attorney of his former
relationship to the juror until subsequent to the trial.
Also stated in the affidavit is the allegation that this
juror at least on one occasion reprimanded the defendant
while both were working at Spanish Fork Foundry ( R . 1 7 , 1 8 ) .
The record does not contain the voir dire
examination, so it is not within the record as to whether
the juror was asked of this relationship or not.
Defendant's motion for a new trial was overruled
by the trial court.
Judgment was pronounced in December, 1975 (R.13)*
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL COURT IN DENYING
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED
SINCE NO ABUSE OF DISCRETION RESULTING IN PREJUDICE TO
APPELLANT WAS SHOWN.
The rule in Utah is that the trial court has
discretion to grant or refuse motions for new trials and
that appellate courts will not disturb such trial court
rulings unless an abuse of discretion, resulting in
prejudice to the defendant, is shown.

State v. Weaver,
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78 Utah 555, 6 P.2d 167 (1931); State v. Draper, 83 Utah
115, 27 P.2d 39 (1933).
Appellant was convicted by a jury, and the
trial court refused to disturb this verdict.

Arguments for

a new trial were heard by the trial court, resulting in a
denial of appellant's motion for a new trial (R.19).

It

is apparent the trial court did not feel that sufficient
grounds existed for a new trial; thus, no disturbance of
the jury's verdict.

This follows the rule of law in Utah

set forth in State v. Kelbach, 23 Utah 2d 231, 238, 461 P.2d
297, 301 (1969):
"This court may not interfere
with a jury verdict, unless upon
review of the entire record, there
emerges errors of sufficient gravity
to indicate that defendant's rights
were prejudiced in some substantial
manner, i.e., the error must be
such that it is reasonably probable
that there would have been a result
more favorable to the appellant in
the absence of error."
Appellant has not shown an abuse of discretion
by the trial court in denying the motion for a new trial.
Even if error were shown, it would have to be such " . . .
that it is reasonably probable that there would have been
a result more favorable to the appellant in the absence
of error."

State v. Kelbach, supra.
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The record in this case does not reflect error.
Appellant alleges in his affidavit that he was employed,
prior to his trial, at Spanish Fork Foundry.

He also

alleges that one of the jurors was a supervisor at
Spanish Fork Foundry, and that on one occasion he
(appellant) was reprimanded by this supervisor (juror)
(R.17).

Appellant alleges in his brief that the juror

did not make these facts known at voir dire.

(There is

no way of determining this, since the voir dire in this
case was not made a part of the record.)

The affidavit

does not establish that the juror in question was
appellant's supervisor, nor does it establish the
relationship, if there was one, between the appellant
and the juror in question.

Appellantfs affidavit alleges

a poor work record while he was employed at Spanish Fork
Foundry, but there is no showing that the juror-supervisor
knew of appellant's poor work record.
No bias is shown by the record in this case,
nor is any probability of bias shown.

The trial court

did not, therefore, abuse its discretion in denying
appellant's motion.

-6-
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POINT II
THE RELATIONSHIP OF MASTER-SERVANT WAS NOT
ESTABLISHED AS GROUNDS FOR A CHALLENGE FOR IMPLIED BIAS
PER UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-30-19(2) (1953).
Utah Code Ann. § 77-30-19(2) (1953), says
in part:
"A challenge for implied
bias may be taken for all or any
of the following causes, and for
no other: . . . (2) Standing in
the relation of . . . master and
servant. . . . "
Appellant cites the above section and argues
that a challenge could have been taken for implied bias
had the juror's answers to voir dire revealed his
relationship to the appellant.

It is to be noted that

the record does not reflect whether or not the juror was
ever questioned on the matter during voir dire, and
since the record does not disclose this, conjecture
outside the record must not be a basis for appellant's
argument.
Appellant's affidavit discloses only that he
and the juror in question, Lawrence Knotts, had worked
at the same time at Spanish Fork Foundry.

There is

no allegation that Knotts was appellant's supervisor.

-7-
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More important, there is no allegation that appellant
was in Knotts' employ at the time of the trial, nor
is there any allegation that any relationship, including
that of master-servant, existed between Knotts and
appellant at the time of the trial.
It is true that generally, the relation of
master and servant or employer and employee between a
party to an action and a prospective juror will serve as
sufficient grounds for a challenge for cause.
869, § 326.

47 Am.Jur.2d

Cases have held, however, that where a juror

was formerly employed by a party to an action, and such
employment no longer exists, an objection to the juror's
competency will not lie. Walter v. Louisville R. Co.,
150 Ky. 652, 150 S.W. 824 (1912).
Appellant failed to establish the relationship of
master-servant at the time of the trial, and therefore was
not entitled to challenge the juror for implied bias under
Utah Code Ann. § 77-30-19(2) (1953).
POINT III
FAILURE OF APPELLANT TO RAISE POSSIBLE VALID
OBJECTION, WHEN HE DISCOVERED DURING TRIAL POSSIBLE GROUNDS
FOR OBJECTION TO JUROR, CONSTITUTED A WAIVER OF ANY SUCH
OBJECTION.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Appellant's affidavit (R.17) states that he
did not recognize Lawrence Knotts until a recess in
the trial when he was pointed out by appellant's
mother, and that appellant never informed his attorney
of this relationship to Lawrence Knotts until subsequent
to the trial.
The well recognized rule of law in most jurisdictions holds that if knowledge of the disqualification
of a juror is acquired after the jury is sworn, but
before verdict, a failure to make objection at the time
will amount to a waiver of the right to a new trial on
that ground.

Queenan v. Territory, 11 Okla. 261, 71

P. 218, aff'd 190 U.S. 548, 47 L.Ed. 1175, 23 S.Ct. 762
(1901); Kelly v. Gulf Oil Corporation, D.C. Pa., 28 F.
Supp. 205, aff'd C.C.A., 105 F.2d 1018 (1939).
This rule of law is followed in Utah.

Browning

v. Bank of Vernal, 60 Utah 197, 207 Pac. 462 (1922).

In

Browning, one of the jurors sustained the relationship
of debtor to the Bank of Vernal (defendant-appellant).
Upon voir dire examination, the juror failed to disclose
this relationship.

It appeared that the assistant
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cashier of the bank had personal knowledge of the relationship of the juror to the bank/ was present in court at the
time of the examination of the jurors respecting their
qualifications as jurors, and did not advise appellant's
counsel of the fact of the relationship.

The Court denied

appellant's motion for a new trial and said:
"The fact that a juror sustains
the relationship of debtor or creditor
to a party to an action does not disqualify the juror to act, but it gives
to the litigant the right to challenge
for cause such juror. That is a right
that can be waived."
The Court further explained the law applicable to the case:
"No matter how good one's cause
of challenge may be, it is clearly
waived where no objection is made when
the jury is impaneled, especially when
he knew the facts constituting the
grounds of challenge. It must appear
that neither the party nor his counsel
had knowledge of the disqualification.
. . . To permit appellant now to insist
upon the disqualification of the juror
as grounds for a new trial, when the
fact of such disqualification was
known to the officers of the appellant
at the time of the trial, would be to
permit litigants to trifle with the
court."
Other Utah cases upheld the trial court's overruling a challenge to jurors for cause after completion of
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the jury, holding that this right to challenge may be
waived.

State v. Lanos, 63 Utah 151, 223 Pac. 1065

(1924); Johnson v. Allen, 108 Utah 148, 158 P.2d 134
(1945).
State v. Draper, 83 Utah 115, 27 P.2d 39
(1933) , which appellant cites, denied a motion for a
new trial.

The motion was made on the grounds that,

after the verdict, it was discovered by defendant and
his counsel for the first time that a juror, prior to
being called in the box, had found and expressed opinions
contrary to his statements on voir dire.

The Court said

that the showing was insufficient to order a new trial,
and that the allegation was insufficient to justify the
conclusion that the juror had prejudiced the case.
In the case at bar, appellant had knowledge
during the trial, and before the verdict, of his former
relationship to Lawrence Knotts. He did not bring this
to the attention of his counsel until after the trial
(T.17).

The proper course of action, if any ground

existed at all for discharge of the juror Knotts or
for a new trial, would have been to inform his counsel,
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and his counsel in turn informing the court.

This was not

done; therefore, any objection was waived by appellant.
As set forth in Union Electric Light and Power
Co. v. Snyder Estate Co., D.C. Mo., 15 F.Supp. 379 (1936)/
parties litigant to a trial cannot gamble and trifle v/ith
the court:
"If the objection now . . . has
such merit as that because of it the
verdict should be set aside, it would
have supported a motion to discharge
the jury before the verdict. A party
cannot gamble with the possibility of
a favorable verdict and then thereafter,
when the verdict proves unfavorable,
raise a question he might have raised
before the verdict."
Appellant had knowledge, but took no action,
thereby waiving his objection to misconduct or disqualification of the juror.

Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada v.

Cushman, 22 Wash.2d 930, 158 P.2d 101 (1945); Nelson v.
Hardesty, 205 Kan. 112, 468 P.2d 173 (1970).
CONCLUSION
The trial court did not commit error in denying
the appellant a new trial and the judgment should be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant
Attorney General
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